(Ackerbau is jetzl motorisierte Emahrungsindustrie, im Wesen das Selbe wie die Fabrikation von Leichen in Gaskammern und Vemichtungslagern, das Selbe wie die Blockade und Aushungerung von Landern, das Selbe wie die Fabrikation von Wasserstoffbomben.) -Martin Heidegger

I. Introduction.
It is common to be encouraged to consider Heidegger as a source of wisdom regarding anti-3Ilthropocentrism, especially because, it is alleged, Heidegger offers a compelling case against the tradition of Western antbropocentrism, be teacbes us how to "think" properly, and he indicates how to dwell authentically on the earth. 1 The purpose of the present article is to argue that it is not worth the time and effort to become familiar with Heidegger's life and writings for the purpose of learning how to argue the case for antianthropocentrism. Heidegger does not succeed in developing a convincing case for bis type of antianthropocentrism; indeed, I will argue that there is sometbing odious about bis critique of anthropocentrism. The interpreter of Heidegger with whom I will be primarily engaged is Micbael Zimmennan, and this for two reasons. First, Zimmennan bas made the most balanced and detailed case for Heidegger as an important theoretician regarding anti-anthropocentrism. Indeed, Heidegger's thought is kept alive largely through talented scbolars like Zimmerman. Second, although a defender of Heidegger. Zimmerman is nonetheless willing to listen to criticisms of Heidegger's Nazism, unlike many dogmatic Heideggerians I have met. 2 Heidegger's Nazism, I will suggest, is related to his inability to be persuasive regarding antianthropocentrism. That is, I will avoid ad hominem arguments in that I will be claiming that Heidegger's anti-anthropocentrism interpenetrates with his intellectualized version of Nazism and is, as a consequence, inadequate for use by animal rightists.
In the following section of the article I will outline Heidegger's critique of anthropocentrism, especially as that critique cbanges from the early to the later Heidegger. My hope in section 2 is not so much to do original Heidegger research as to indicate in a
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preliminary way what some of the problems are with several of the best known ideas in Heidegger's work from the perspective of a version of anti-antlIropocentrism quite different from Heidegger's, specifically an animal rights version of anti-anthropocentrism. In section 3 I will consider Zimmerman's criticisms of Heidegger's anti-anthropocentrism, criticisms which are notewortlIy because Zimmerman has developed the most sophisticated defense of environmentalism on a Heideggarian basis. But I will also try to show in sections 3 and 4 that some of the defects in Heidegger's thought are found in Zimmerman's as well, even in the thought of the later Zimmerman, which is more critical of Heidegger than the thought of the early Zimmerman. My own criticisms of Heidegger, and to a lesser extent of Zimmerman, have to do with the failure to acknowledge (Heidegger) or to defend consistently (Zimmerman) the rights of sentient individuals. Heidegger's own hatred of individualism and of rights was a contributing factor in his becoming a fascist, but, more importantly for the purposes of this article, denigration of individual rights by deep ecologists-including Heideggerian deep ecologists like Zimmerman-runs tlle danger of environmental fascism if not of fascism per se.
Heidegger's Critique of Anthropocentrism.
Heidegger's fundamental insigllt in Being and TIme is that there is a difference between Being and entities, (or beings). We are familiar with entities, like shoes or cows or numbers. But we have a hard time specifying what Being or is-ness means. On Heidegger's well-known view, Being is not an entity but refers to the selfmanifesting, presencing, or revealing of entities. For an entity to be (Le., to present or manifest itself), a corresponding absencing is needed, a cle.-'Uing constituted by human existence. In effect, humans are both a kind of entity and the clearing in which entities can he manifest.
In this regard there is a minimal and non-botlIersome anthropocentrism in Heidegger's thought. when we exist in a way that lets entities be what they are instead of forcing them to serve our needs only. By allowing our understanding to be used solely for the purpose of dominating entities, we have left the material world in general and animals in particular as inert and without intrinsic purpose. To the extent that Dasein is the measurer in Heidegger's philosophy, it is important to notice that human temporality is such that as epochs change entities show themselves in different ways. Natural entities, including animals, in modem philosophy often appear as strictly material mechanisms, and this is largely due to Descartes. These mechanisms are seen primarily as instruments for socio-economic purposes or for scientiftc investigation. It is Heidegger's belief that it is only by reappropriating our philosophical tradition, by rethinking Plato and Descartes and almost everyone else between the presocratics and Heidegger himself, that this bothersome sort of anthropocentrism can be ameliorated. 5 Heidegger's replacement for the bothersome sort of anthropocentrism seems to be what he calls "the fourfold" (das Geviert), a configuration of earth and sky, mortal beings and the gods, wherein the order of nature emerges not out of a divine or human plan but out of the capacity of individuals to behave in their own ways such that they nonetheless produce an overall harmony: individuals adjust themselves to other individuals. 6 The clearing of an open space in our culture so as to see animals largely reveals them as use values or as commodities; in a very real sense "primitive" peoples did not see the same sorts of chickens we see?
Chickens are put in a frame (Gestell) for us by sciencetechnology. And it should be emphasized that there is no crucial distinction in Heidegger between science and technology, since science has in recent centuries been integrally connected to the will to power.
In his later philosophy, Heidegger did not attribute inauthenticity to a lack of personal resoluteness but to a cultural phenomenon (i. e., to anthropocentrism). Authentic human existence in his later philosophy consists in the realization that humans are but one element in the fourfold, and not necessarily the most important one. This realization was never lost by peasants, on Zimmerman's interpretation of Heidegger, even if it has been lost (or better, killed) by agribusinessmen on factory farms. Because we have an obligation, according to Heidegger, to let things be, it would seem to be worse if an animal were killed by some human deed than if the animal were killed naturally.
Several questions need to be asked here, however.
a. There is the question of whether the antianthropocentrism entailed in the fourfold is a variety of anti-humanism, as I will allege, or, as Zimmerman aIleges, is a type of "higher humanism" or "beyond humanism There is a type of reciprocity in animals which is clearly not found in inanimate things, but it is less clear how inferior animals are to human beings. Animals are not worldbuilding (weltbildend) beings, but they do encircle themselves (Sichumringen) with stimuli in ways that make inadequate any behavioristic analysis of them. Their openness to entities nonetheless is not to entities as entities, and this is apparently because of their failure to possess language. Rather, their openness is merely for the purpose of the release of drives. Both behaviorism and the theory of evolution treat animals in abstraction from this partial openness, hence Heidegger holds that animals demand of us a specific mode of "transposedness" (Versetztsein that all entities are mere objects and that science is the basic (or me only reliable) source of information. Hence regarding these views Heidegger was correct, according to Zimmerman, to be distrustful. However, "insofar as Heidegger refused to take seriously the organic dimension of human existence, he may well be accused of having remained in a curious way tied to the humancentered, dualistic metaphysical tradition of which he was so critical."16 These criticisms are fine as far as they go, but regarding (c) Zimmerman only scratches the surface of what is bothersome about Heidegger's version of antiantllropocentrism, a version which is, as Zimmerman notes, integrally connected to a reactionary critique not only of industrialism but also of the whole modem world, including its notions of rights and autonomy. Zimmerman's criticism here goes like this:
deep ecologists must examine seriously the implications of Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism. His willingness to support an authoritarian regime to "solve" the problems posed by modernity and industrialism, the ease with which he abandoned the principles of respect of the rights of others, his talk about a mystical "union" between Volk and earth, and his hierarchical views about those "gifted" with insight about me meaning of history-all this must give pause to those deep ecologists, most of whom recognize that authoritarianism, hierarchism, and communitarianism without respect for individual freedom are by no means "solutions" to the environmental crisis .... Deep ecologists want to be able to speak about the organic relatedness of all life on earth without being accused of reverting to fascist mythologizing. 17 I would like to make it clear at this point that I am not claiming, nor is Zimmerman claiming, that Heidegger's philosophy is worthless because, say, he never clearly assigned blame to Germany or to the Nazis orto himselffor events between 1933 and 1945. Rather, I am only trying to advance me limited claim that there is a world of difference between, first, an antianthropocentrism which nonetheless acknowledges mat anthropoi are worthy of respect and are possessors of rights and, secondly, an anti-anthropocentrism which is perversely anti-human, to the point where, as the quotation at the beginning of this article indicates, there is no moral difference between machines that harvest wheat, those that milk cows, and the gas chambers. Heidegger is an example of the latter antianthropocentrism, whereas Isaac Bashevis Singer is an example of the fonner. ls
When Singer suggests that animals are constantly in danger of being sent to a humanly imposed "Treblinka" or that we often act like Nazis toward animals, he nonetheless makes it abundantly clear that: (a) the real Treblinka was a morally evil place, and (b) the nine million people killed in the death camps-six million of whom were Jews-constitute a still greater evil than the very real evil of, say, nine million animals killed in slaughterhouses or laboratories. Heidegger, by way of contrast, never condemned Treblinka, leaving some people to wonder whether he, as a good Nazi to the end, perhaps approved of it. But even if he had condemned Treblinka, it is by no means clear that he would have, or even could have, done so in any tenns stronger than he could have offered against the killing of nine million animals or nine million blades of grass. Even mowing the lawn violates the vague Heideggerian imperative to let things be (Gelassenheit). Admittedly, to let things be is not to be purely passive. It is (a) to open up a clearing in which things disclose themselves without undue interference and (b) to interact with things in respectful ways. But Heidegger is not helpful at all regarding what such respect means in our dealings with animals.
There is something instructive in the (speciesist) cliche that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. It is dangerous both to human and to other animal species to abandon rights in favor of the obscure notion that we should let things be. If Zimmennan is to be faulted, it is on two grounds. First, despite the fact that tlle later Zimmennan finds the quotation from Heidegger at tlle beginning of this article "astonishing," he thinks it has negative implications only regarding our evaluation of Heidegger's politics and not regarding his antianthropocentrism. And second, although Zimmennan has largely left behind his earlier (very Heideggerian) cliticism of rights, he still shows traces of Heidegger's apparent stance that the Holocaust (and, we could add, mass extennination of animals)is more due to advanced technology than it is to a denigration of sentient individuals (whether pigs or Gypsies). When the later Zimmennan says that "Mass extennination in tlle Nazi Between the Species camps was possible only because of developments within industrial technology," it should be noted that the crucial piece of technology needed for the Holocaust to occur was the railroad and precise rail scheduling, which had been in existence since the nineteenth century. The final solution was far more of a low-tech operation than Heideggerians like to admit. That is, it will not do to blame technology simpliciter for disrespect shown to sentient individuals. 19 The remainder of this article will consist of an attempt to expand on Zimmennan's rather mild criticisms of Heidegger regarding these two areas.
Several of the features ofHeidegger's thought which some find appealing, such as the idealization of peasant life contained in his notion of the four-fold, are nonetheless bothersome both because they appear to suggest simply a rejection of modem science, rather than a critical engagement with it, and because they seem to be connected with a notion of tradition that entails a rather vicious version of nationalism. Indeed, Heidegger refers to a new appropriation of Western tradition by Gennan language and philosophy, but this newness suggests that proper limits for human behavior toward other species cannot he established through current legal or moral fonns but only by Being itself, whatever that means. As Zimmennan notes, the new ethos suggested by Heidegger only seems to make sense if Being is hypostasized and personalized into a divine agent, as in his well-known claim that only a God can save us now. 20 Even if Heidegger is correct in claiming that human beings go astray when they forget that they are not self-created, it is not clear that reminding us of that fact helps very much without an explicit statement of theistic belief on Heidegger's part: if Being is not to be divinized, why should we believe, along with Zimmennan, that we are "brought forth so that entities can manifest themselves "? (my emphasis)21
Zimmennan's earlier thought was very much in the spirit of Heidegger in the claim that the philosophical doctrine of human rights justifies exploitation of nonhuman as well as human beings, presumably because the doctrine of rights is necessarily tied to anthropocentrlsm and hence to exploitation in general. 22 Rights, it seems, get in the way of our "primary obligation": to be open to the Being of entities. But not even the early Zimmennan favors Heidegger when he attacks not only rights but the whole project of morality, as is evidenced in the following puzzling quotation from Heidegger:
Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let things be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid-solely as the object of its doing. 23 It is not surprising that this "leveling gaze," as Richard Wolin calls it,24 is more compatible with the deep ecological variety of anti-anthropocentrism than it is with the animal rights variety. Zimmerman, with John Rodman on his side,25 does not think that human beings are in a position to extend rights to other beings if their own hold on them is questionable. 26 Our supposed obligation to Being does in fact threaten the loss of hard-won rights. On early Zimmerman's Heideggerian view, political activism on behalf of animals itself is part of the problem in that it indicates a confidence that (frenetic) human activity can really improve things. Zimmerman admits that Heidegger's attitude toward animals is not consistent:
at times he sees all entities as instances of physis, and at other times he concludes that human beings are radically different from animals and the rest of nature. Animals, on this latter alternative, lack openness to Being; hence, they cannot know that entities are. It is crucial to notice, however, that any attempt to gain consistency here would require an engagement with certain biological and psychological phenomena (like the central nervous system or the presence of pain), an engagement which is, according to Heideggerian reasoning, itself a type of activity and a type of Technik which leads us further into a forgetfulness of Being. As Heidegger continued to work his way out of subjectivism and anthropocentrism, he made it harder and harder to assess exactly where the similaribes and differences are between human beings and animals and how these similarities and differences have an impact on ethical questions. It is decidedly not the case, as the early Zimmerman alleges, that those who wish to extend rights to animals can do so only by seeing them as lesser human beings. In fact, animal rightists who defend the argument from marginal cases are often criticized because of their belief tllat many animals deserve more respect than some human beings.
27
The later Zimmerman shows at least some willingness to "make use of' available ethical theories, including theories defending rights, to prevent exploitation from occurring, but this is not his usual view, which rests foursquare on deep ecology's attachment to what Steve Sapontzis calls "total holism." Zimmerman thinks that somehow or other we will find adequate ways of dealing with inevitable conflicts among individuals and among species without utilitarianism and without rights theory. He hopes that somehow or other, by letting things be, these conflicts will sort themselves out. 28 To some extent, Heidegger was following his predecessors Hegel and Nietzsche in claiming that the world-historical individual is "beyond good and evil." By portraying ethical matters as secondary considerations which arise within and which are limited to a particular historical world, however, Heidegger ran the risk of justifying whatever ethical form of life happened to emerge in a world "founded" by a new work of art. The demented "world" of National Socialism reveals what may be "justified" when artistic considerations are allowed to triumph over supposedly outmoded ethical ones. Heidegger's refusal to describe his behavior between 1933 and 1945 in terms of moral guilt stemmed from his belief that his "ontological calling" to found a new world removed him from the moral censure that pertained only to ordinary people. Of course, since the German people themselves were "extraordinary" in being called to the dangerous mission of founding a new world, since they risked so much in this noble venture, they too-in Heidegger's eyes-were not morally culpable. 3o
Ethics for Heidegger was part and parcel of the nihilistic modern age; hence, afortiori, ethical concern
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for animals is at best misplaced. The later Zimmerman puts the point as follows:
Heidegger could never straightforwardly admit that by "deconstructing" what he regarded as the Enlightenment's insidious principles of universal economic and political rights, by declaring that traditional JudeoChristian moral beliefs had been vacated by the death of God, by claiming that new historical worlds arise from a primal source that is "beyond good and evil," and by working to found such a world based on artisticontological, not moral considerations, he helped to make possible the triumph of a truly radical evil. 31 Although tlle later Zimmerman at least claims to be opposed to Heidegger's denigration of ethics, his deep ecological principles lead him to a "biocentric egalitarianism" wherein we are supposed to "love and respect all things," and presumably to love and respect them equally, if Zimmerman is serious about his egalitarianism. In short, we are likely to be left with an analogous sort of leveling gaze in the later Zimmerman that\ve are left with in Ule later Heidegger. I would like to make it abundantly clear that Zimmerman is no fascist, even if he is open to Tom Regan's charge of "environmental fascism." But neither Heidegger nor Zinunerman get off their respective hooks by claiming that the death camps and factory farms alike are predictable outcomes of the reckless power impulse of the Enlightenment without also confronting, as Zimmerman to some extent does, the liberatory gains made possible by tlle Enlightenment, gains whose beneficiaries include peas~mts, slaves, blacks, women, and belatedly, animals. It is no accident that the most widely read book written by a philosopher on the topic of animal "rights" is titled "Animal Liberation."32 Heidegger' s (inconsistently applied) strategy of avoidance of ethical distinctions is revelatory not only biographically but also philosophically, in that it is necessitated by his belief that "the world must be forced to collapse and the earth must be driven to desolation"33 before primal truth can be recaptured. Hence, factory fa.'1l1s and crematoria may actually be welcomed by Heidegger, if they help to bring about a turning away from Technik and a turning toward authentic techne (as art). (In Ulis regard, Heidegger looks like a latter day Emperor Claudius.),fhat is, technological nihilism engenders its opposite, as in the lines from Holderlin of which Heidegger was fond: "Where the danger is, grows the saving power also." It is convenient not only for Heidegger the man but also for Heidegger the philosopher to say that events in the various slaughterhouses of Europe, in which all "cats" are grey, are not due to real life individuals but to Seinsvergessenheit. According to Wolin, one of the reasons why Heidegger did not deal adequately with real individuals was his fascination with the abstraction "concreteness" and the abstraction "historicity" at the expense of the concrete and historical:
There is no smaIl measure of irony that such short-comings must be attributed to a thinker whose claim to philosophical originality in the 1920s was based on an avowed revival of the dimension of existential concreteness that was otherwise so lacking in modem philosophy; a thinker whose great achievement was a purported reincorporation of "history"-via the category of "historicity"-into modem philosophical discourse. In truth, it is the essential facts of twentieth-century political life that Heidegger, time and again, shows himself incapable of comprehending. 34 Jurgen Habermas also thinks that Heidegger's etherealness (which Heidegger's followers confuse with profundity) is part of the problem:
Because Being withdraws itself from the assertive grasp of descriptive statements, because it can only be encircled in indirect discourse and "rendered silent," the destinings of Being remain undiscoverable. The propositionally contentless speech about Being has, nevertheless, the illocutionary sense of demanding resignation to fate. Its practicalpolitical side consists in the perlocutionary effect of a diffuse readiness to obey in relation to an indeterminate authority. 35 The eclipse of practical reason is no boon to human beings or animals or the natural environment. Wolin once again is perceptive regarding Heidegger's views in a quotation which is well worth the consideration of animal rightists:
Rather than attempting to isolate the process whereby instrumental reason, as tied to tile forces of the modern economy, has been elevated to the status of an end in itself at the expense of its practical corollary, his theoretical orientation seeks instead to promote a rejection of rationality in totO. 36 Even if, as the argument from marginal cases indicates, tllere is no simple way of asserting tilat tile value of every human life is superior to tllat of every animal, Wolin is nonetlleless correct in suggesting that there is something worse tilan useless in a misology which culminates in an incapacity to distinguish llinong the slaughter of a rational humllil being, tlle slaughter of a nonrational yet sentient animal, and tile felling of a tree or tlle damming of a river. 3 ? 4. Individual Animals.
The upshot of tlle previous section is tllat: a. Zimmennan has oone an excellent job of indicating what tlle implications of Heidegger's tllOught are for animals, in particular, and for tlle environment, in general;
b. the later Zimmennan makes at least some progress witll respect to criticism of Heidegger's thought in tllis regard; but c. even the later Zimmennan fails to emphasize, llild tllis due to his commitment to deep ecology, tlle dmlgers involved in a denigration of rights llild/or concern for sentient individuals.
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That is, tllere are good reasons for defending tlle animal rights variety of anti-antllropocentrism, ratller tilan tlle deep ecology version, especially when we find deep ecologists-but not Zimmermanspeaking favorably of Malthus or AIDS. Two quite different animal rightists can be used together to detail the defects in deep ecological antianthropocentrism, in general, and its Heideggerian variety, in particular: Tom Regan and Steve Sapontzis. Regan has ably shown, I tllink, tllat not all living tllings are subjects-of-a-life; hence, living tllings are not to he viewed as having tlle same moral status. It may be the case that there are individuals who are not subjects-of-a-life but who do have inherent value of some sort: the very possibility of developing a genuine ethic of the environment, as distinct from an ethic for its use, turns on the possibility of making the case that natural objects, though they do not meet the subject-of-a-life criterion, can nonetheless have inherent value. 38 But those who try to establish the case for inherent value, he thinks, have their work cut out for them even if tlle task is not impossible. Altllough Heideggerians may be (unwittingly) correct, at least with respect to wild animals, to simply let them be, there is a considerable difficulty involved when trying to reconcile the individualistic nature of moral rights witll tile total holistic view of Heideggerian deep ecologists:
It is difficult to see how thc notion of the rights of tlle individual could find a home witllin a view that, emotive connotations to one side, might be fairly dubbed "environmental fascism." To use Leopold's telling phrase, man is only a member of tlle biotic team."39
Heidegger's own case indicates how close a connection there is between environmental fascism and fascism per se; hence, tllere is notlling histrionic in Regan's use of the tenn "fascism":
If, to take an extreme, fanciful but, it is hoped, not unfair exarnple, tlle situation we faced was eitller to kill a rare wildflower or a (plentiful) human being, and if tlle wildflower, as a 'tearn member," would contribute more to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community than the human, then presumably we would not be doing wrong if we killed the human and saved the wildflower. The rights view cannot abide this position... because it denies the propriety of deciding what should be done to individuals who have rights by appeal to aggregati ve considerations .... Environmentai fascism and the rights view arc like oil and water: they don't mix. 4o
Although Sapontzis' version of anti-anthropocentrism is very often at odds with Regan's, they complement each other in the effort to show the defects in deep ecological anti-anthropocentrism, particularly in its Heideggerian variety. Considering tlle long-term well-being of human beings and of animals includes a healthy supply of oxygen, rich soil, etc. Parking lots and plastic trees do not contribute to healthy animal life. Sapontzis is correct in claiming that there is a false dilemma between individualism and holism. Rights theory, utilitarianism, virtue-based ethics, and Sapontzis' own version ofethical scepticism are alike in being panially holistic. The total holism of (early and late) Zinunerman or of J. Baird Callicott, wherein the good of the biotic community is the ultimate measure of ethical value is, if not a type of fascism, at the very least a type of indifference to the suffering of animals and of human beings:
The common moral goal of reducing the suffering in life and otherwise making life more enjoyable and fulfilling would not obviously be more etIectively pursued by valuing individuals only as contributors to a community. Indeed, since it is individuals, not communities, that experience enjoyment, fulfillment, distress, and frustration, and since total holism proposes regarding individuals as disposable items in the pursuit of the integrity, stability, and beauty of the community, it seems reasonable to conclude that total holism would not provide as likely a path to this moral goal as our current, mixed morality, which directly values individuals and their quality of life.
to premodern existence, wherein lies a more symbiotic relationship with the natural environment, a dream which might be taken -:fl.ore seriously if Callicott and Heidegger were not:
fundamentally out of touch with contemporary morality, which emphasizes compassion for the injured, the sick, and the handicapped, tolerance for diverse ways of life, concern to expand the diversity of opportunities and experiences available to people, protecting the weak against the strong, and hope for progress. 42 And this progress, on the animal rightist's version of antianthropocentrism, is more likely to occur if we were to:
consider the case of the dog: even if no other sentient being values it (or could value it), the dog can still have feelings of well-being about itself and its condition and can, therefore, still be of value for itself. Thus, the dog can be valued not only by anoilier, either as an instrument or for itself; the dog can also be valued by itself, and it is that latter possibility, and the moral significance of it, that is at issue in the debate over animal rights and that is completely lacking in the case of nonsentient entities.
43
It is not the case, as Callicott and the early Zimmerman allege, that emphasis on individual rights and on only partial holism will necessarily mean destruction of the natural environment: nonsentient parts' of nature have aesthetic and symbolic significance; they have life-support and economic and recreational value; they have scientific and historical and religious inspiration value; they help us to build character and to appreciate both the pretty and the sublime; etc. Consequently, carrying on the work of animal protection and reform does not require ascTibing direct moral status to nonsentient entities.44 That is, once we abandon the Heideggerian and deep ecological belief in "biocentric egalitarianism," as Zimmerman refers to it, we are not necessarily committed to the belief iliat nonsentient beings have value only as natural resources. It is not clear to me that Heidegger's "egalitarianism," if that is the word for the perverse position he defends, can help human beings or animals or, for that matter, nonsentient nature. If help is to be given, it is most likely to come from the creative tension among the thoughts of rights theorists like Regan know] what will remain of our transitory works.... The only certainty is that our fierce will, inclined toward the future, gives a meaning and brings support to our most simple effort. The individual by himself counts for notlling. It is the destiny of our nation incamated by its state that matters. 47
Heidegger also claims tllat "In troUl, however, my works belong not to my person, but instead they serve the Gennan future and belong to it."48 Zimmennan is to be commended for the way in which he, in his later philosophy, at times speaks of the intrinsic worth of individual members of an ecosystem (but which?), and of individual freedoms (but whose?). It is when he speaks in tllis manner that he is justified in resenting the charge that deep ecologists are calling for fascist measures to sacrifice individuals for the sake of the larger cosmic whole. 49 But there are still some areas even in the later Zimmerman that are likely to bother animal rightists and political liberals. There is perhaps good reason for Zimmennan to encourage not the destruction of but rather the surpassing of the ego as part of the "emancipation" of nature, but such an emancipation would have to occur before the need for rights is surpassed. For example, in the most recent Zimmennan we fmd him criticizing the radical deep ecologist Christopher Manes for abandoning rights, but only because Manes does so without a trace of irony, as if such an abandonment would be tolerable if done ironically. Zimmennan also implicitly denigrates rights when he repeatedly refers to his position as a biocentric egalitarianism: are we to assume that certain rocks or grasses are morally equal to cows and human beings? We are not told. And in the most recent Zimmennan, the word "rights" is still placed in scare quotes. 50 17 Ibid., p. 243. Zimmerman alerts us to the fact that one of the most influential writers on ecological issues, Murray Bookchin, has warned that Heidegger's thought is tainted with fascism and is thus a dubious source of wisdom regarding a closer tie to nature, if only because the Nazis themselves quite clearly exploited the earth as a symbol for their movement.
